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MAY HARVEY REST IN PEACE:
LAKIN V. POSTAL LIFE AND
CASUALTY COMPANY
Robert H. Jerry, 11*
You know, the Stone was really not such a wonderful thing. As much money and life
as you could want! The two things most human beings would choose above all - the
trouble is, humans do have a knack of choosing precisely those things that are worst
for them.'
More than a quarter-century has passed since I entered law school as a
first-year student and began what has become a career of reading, among other
things, cases. I cannot even guess the number of cases I have read in the ensu-
ing years. Most of them have been fairly ordinary, but many have been won-
derful for one reason or another. Because I hope to read at least as many cases
during my next twenty-five years (or more) of legal study, I am not yet ready to
crown any particular case with the title of "my favorite," "the most significant,"
or a similar salutation.
There is, however, one case that has piqued my interest in recent years.
Lakin v. Postal Life & Casualty Co.2 is, in many respects, an unlikely choice.
Unlike Ryan v. New York Central Railroad Co.,3 Lakin does not reflect an
important chapter in the development of our nation, when the expansion of the
railroads ushered in a period of unprecedented economic growth and courts
were forced to articulate tort and insurance law rules that would either facilitate
or hinder this expansion.4 Unlike Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux,5 Lakin
does not involve a statute of nationwide applicability, the interpretation of
which has profound consequences for not only federal-state relations but also
policyholders' remedies for insurers' breaches of their duties under policies
provided by employers as fringe benefits. 6 Unlike Pan American World Air-
ways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,7 which interpreted a policy exclu-
sion relating to war and similar catastrophes in the context of a terrorist group's
destruction of a jetliner in Lebanon, Lakin is not relevant, as the Pan American
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4 For more discussion of Ryan, see David A. Fischer & Robert H. Jerry, II, Teaching Torts
Without Insurance: A Second-Best Solution, 45 ST. Louis UNIv. L.J. 857, 878-81 (2001).
5 481 U.S. 41 (1987), remanded to 821 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1987).
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INSURANCE LAW 78-80 (2d ed. 1996).
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case suddenly is, to insurance coverage issues arising out of the most expensive
man-made catastrophe and the most destructive terrorist act in the history of the
planet.8
Lakin is a relatively simple story of two men whose paths crossed in Kan-
sas City, Missouri, more than forty years ago. One was a down-in-the-luck
drifter, and the other a con-artist who made his living by taking advantage of
others. These two men would be long forgotten but for the fact that their final
interactions during a hunting trip near Pleasant Hill, Missouri, raised some
insurance law issues that ultimately made their way to the Missouri Supreme
Court. Lakin stands for the unremarkable proposition that the legal relationship
of one partner to another is not, by itself, sufficient to establish an insurable
interest. If one partner takes out insurance on the life of the other partner in
circumstances where the partner cestui que vie9 has neither capital nor skills to
contribute to the partnership, it does not automatically follow that the partner
who owns the policy on the other's life has an insurable interest sufficient to
support the policy.
Indeed, Lakin is not even the most notorious case involving guns, hunting,
and insurance. The common fact pattern involves someone procuring insur-
ance on the life of another, taking the cestui que vie on a hunting trip, and the
cestui que vie's mysteriously perishing in what is claimed to be an "acci-
dent."'" In this genre, Rubenstein v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York"
8 On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four U.S. commercial aircraft and succeeded in
using three of the planes, including the civilians inside them, as missiles to destroy the
World Trade Center towers in New York City and a portion of the Pentagon in Washington,
D.C. At this writing, the death toll is unknown, but will run far into the thousands, and the
economic losses, which will take years to determine, will probably be measured in terms of
some percentage of the United States' gross domestic product. Although the insurance impli-
cations of this event are trivial relative to the human dimensions of the tragedy, the attack is
the most significant and complex event in the history of the insurance business.
9 Cestui que vie (often shortened to "CQV") is a French term meaning the person whose life
is the subject of the policy. The CQV may or may not be the owner of the policy. For
example, a parent may purchase a life insurance policy for a child CQV. The beneficiary
can be anyone chosen by the owner. See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CON-
TRACT DISPUTES §§18.01, 18.02 (2d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2001); JOHN F. DOBBYN, INSURANCE
LAW IN A NUTSHELL 7 (3d ed. 1996).
10 For another example, see Overstreet v. Ky. Cent. Life Ins., 747 F. Supp. 1195 (W.D. Va.
1990), affirmed in part, rev'd in part, 950 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1991) (hunting "accident" later
found to be murder, and murderer implicates owner and beneficiary of policy on decedent's
life in murder plot). For a variation on the facts (husband takes wife on fishing trip, and wife
perishes due to gun "accident" on boat), see Craig v. State, 347 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1961), overruled in part by Mays v. State, 536 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
A hunting trip is not, of course, necessary to carry out a kill-for-profit scheme. Con-
sider, for example, Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Allen, 259 N.W. 281 (Mich. 1935),
where the partnership was the named beneficiary on policies on the lives of two partners, and
one partner died due to "hemorrhage following ruptured gastric ulcer" after he was "wres-
tling or struggling" with the other partner. Id. at 282. The court specifically observed that
"[t]he mortality among the partners of Charles Elson [the surviving partner] was rather
high," and the court mentioned the suspicious circumstances of the deaths of three other
partners, including one who died from a fall down a stairway. Id. The court sustained the
insurer's refusal to pay on the ground of false representations and fraud in the application.
Id. at 286. Insurance has figured prominently in many other murders and intentional kill-
ings, some of which were disguised by the perpetrators in an attempt to make them seem to
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is probably the most famous, even if the most recent activities of the central
figure in the case are not well known. A brief excursion through the facts of
Rubenstein is an appropriate way to set the stage for a look at Lakin.
I. MAY HAROLD, DARRELL, EVELYN, AND KRYSTAL REST IN PEACE
Until 1979, Alan Rubenstein's principal business accomplishment had
been owning and driving a taxi cab in New Orleans. Rubenstein was not with-
out ambition, however, and this led him to attend a seminar that prompted his
interest in starting the sort of periodical that takes paid advertisements and is
distributed without charge to the public. It appears, however, that Rubenstein
did not see the paid advertisements as the most direct path to financial success.
Rubenstein placed a notice through the Louisiana Unemployment Com-
mission seeking assistance in developing the TV Journal, and a twenty-three
year old named Harold Connor responded to it. Rubenstein (only about thirty
years of age himself) and Connor met shortly thereafter, and on August 7,
1979, they entered into a business arrangement under which Connor agreed to
pay Rubenstein $1,000 a month for a franchise. This was a substantial fee,
given the fact that the publication had no reasonable prospects of success for a
host of reasons, 2 but Connor did take a twenty-five percent stake in the opera-
tion. On that same date, the men also met with a Mutual of New York
(MONY) insurance agent, who recommended that Rubenstein purchase
$240,000 of credit life insurance (to secure Connor's "debt" to Rubenstein) on
Connor. This was a stunning recommendation, given that Connor had no expe-
rience in the publishing business and no education past high school and had
worked, without success, only for about two months as a furniture salesman.
be accidents. See, e.g., State v. Castor, 632 N.W.2d 298 (Neb. 2001) (wife's murder of
husband in circumstances where she stood to benefit from insurance proceeds); Cont'l
Assurance Co. v. Diorio-Volungis, 746 N.E.2d 550 (Mass. App. 2001) (wife held not an
accessory before the fact in murder of her husband, in circumstances where she had arranged
for several policies to be issued on his life shortly before his death); State v. Roth, 881 P.2d
268, 277 (Wash. App. 1994) (defendant convicted of first-degree murder of his fourth wife,
who died in a rafting "accident"; defendant's first wife died in fall from 300-foot cliff while
hiking; court reasons that "a rational trier of fact could find that Roth was the 'mastermind'
of an overarching plan to marry, insure, and murder women in order to obtain large insur-
ance recoveries"); Lunsford v. W. States Life Ins., 908 P.2d 79 (Colo. 1996) (wife purchases
more than $200,000 of life insurance on husband in six months before she arranges his
murder); Cerro Gordo Charity v. Fireman's Fund Am. Life Ins. Co., 819 F.2d 1471 (8th Cir.
1987) (half-brother murdered half-sister as part of scheme to recover insurance proceeds on
half-sister; approximately $3.5 million of insurance at issue under various policies); Lopez v.
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 406 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. Dist. App. 1981) (plaintiff, who survived physi-
cal attack, states cause of action against insurers who issued policies to wife on his life);
Ramey v. S.C. Life Ins. Co., 135 S.E.2d 362 (S.C. 1964) (insured has cause of action against
insurer for injuries sustained when wife attempted to murder him by arsenic poisoning to
recover insurance proceeds); Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 100 So. 2d 696 (Ala.
1957) (father of deceased daughter can sue insurer for negligence in issuing insurance poli-
cies to aunt-in-law of deceased, who murdered insured daughter to recover insurance
proceeds).
" 584 F. Supp. 272 (E.D. La. 1984).
12 A multitude of facts on this point are set forth in the court's opinion. See id. at 275-77.
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Moreover, no magazine had been published, and no advertisements had been
sold. 13
According to the testimony of three witnesses who knew Connor well,
Connor had "never been hunting before and was disgusted by the idea of killing
animals." This, however, did not deter Connor from going on the hunting trip
with Rubenstein (unless one surmises that Connor made the trip against his
will), although it is curious that Connor did not pack the proper clothing for this
trip.14 With the hunting expedition starting on such a promising note, it is not
surprising that the court would summarize what was known about the circum-
stances surrounding Connor's death during the trip as "bizarre," with the evi-
dence from the five eyewitnesses "largely in dispute and somewhat
irreconcilable."' 5
On November 5, 1979, Rubenstein, three of his relatives (two step-chil-
dren and one of their cousins; one of the step-children was Darrell Perry, who
was about twelve years old at the timel 6), and Connor left New Orleans, stay-
ing overnight at Rubenstein's parents' house. The next morning, the party was
joined by Rubenstein's brother and Michael Fournier, a convicted felon then on
probation who was one of his brother's friends. They went to a secluded loca-
tion in the woods; the cousin proceeded to lock the car keys in the car. After
the locked car door was finally opened, Fournier, who was standing about ten
feet behind Connor with a single-shot twelve-gauge shotgun (even though he
was prohibited by the terms of his probation from carrying firearms), dis-
charged a single shot into Connor's back, killing him.
Fournier claimed that he tripped and that the gun discharged when the butt
of the gun was close to the ground and while the barrel was pointed diagonally
upward in Connor's direction. This contradicted expert testimony that the shot-
gun pellets had a lateral path through Connor's body, as well as expert testi-
mony that because of the gun's safety device, the gun could not have fired
simply by striking the ground. In other words, the gun would not fire unless it
were loaded and cocked and the trigger pulled (presumably by Fournier, who
admitted he was holding the gun when it fired). In these circumstances, the
court concluded that Connor "was killed under highly suspicious circum-
stances, circumstances that suggest something far more sinister than a mere
'accident.'"17
When Rubenstein claimed the proceeds of the policy in his status as the
owner and designated beneficiary in the policy on Connor's life, the insurer
declined to pay. Rubenstein sued, and the insurer's defense cited numerous
misrepresentations on the application and Rubenstein's lack of insurable inter-
est. The latter argument was based upon the "grossly disproportionate" amount
of insurance Rubenstein purchased relative to the value of Connor's contribu-
'3 Id. at 274-75, 277.
14 Id. at 277.
15 Id.
16 The court in Rubenstein would spell the step-son's name as "Darryl," but news reports in
2000 about the step-son's murder consistently spell his name "Darrell."
17 Id. at 278.
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tion to this anemic, undercapitalized business venture. The court agreed with
both of the insurer's defenses and dismissed the plaintiffs complaint.
1 8
Whether the agent for MONY should have ever solicited the policy is a
fair question to ask, of course. But this raises a set of questions separate from
whether Rubenstein should have received the proceeds. As the court's thinly
veiled speculations suggest, the odds seem quite high that Rubenstein was
involved in a plot to murder his business partner in order to strike it rich at the
expense of an insurance company. No doubt the adjusters for MONY desired
that Rubenstein should be disqualified as a slaying beneficiary (or as one who
purchased insurance on the life of another with a simultaneously held intent to
murder the cestui que vie), but desire based on hope and disqualification based
on evidence are two very different things. With the lack of sufficiently strong
evidence to establish Rubenstein's responsibility for the slaying beyond a pre-
ponderance, MONY turned to misrepresentation and insurable interest argu-
ments to escape the possibility of paying proceeds to someone whose
involvement in the cestui que vie's death seemed all too likely.
One might have hoped that Rubenstein's interest in making money
through the purchase of insurance on the lives of others might have waned after
his unsuccessful effort to recover on the policy on Connor's life. Tragically,
this was not to be the case. Darrell Perry, Rubenstein's step-son, would later
enter adulthood and marry a woman named Evelyn Ann, with whom he would
have a daughter, Krystal Ryan, in 1989. In 1991, Rubenstein purchased a
$250,000 insurance policy on the life of Krystal, his then two-year-old step-
granddaughter, and named his wife, Doris, as the beneficiary.
According to media reports on the contents of court records, in the fall of
1993, Rubenstein took his step-son Darrell, his daughter-in-law Evelyn, and his
step-granddaughter Krystal to a cabin he owned in Mississippi, supposedly to
give them a place to work through marital difficulties. Rubenstein made at
least two trips to the cabin before Thanksgiving 1993.19 After Doris did not
hear from her son, Rubenstein drove to the cabin on December 16th to look for
them and reported discovering their three bodies, all murdered. Although the
precise time of their deaths is subject to some dispute, Darrell and Evelyn had
been stabbed, and Krystal had been strangled.2 ° Later, Rubenstein would tes-
tify that he collected the insurance proceeds and "blew" the money.2 1 After a
lengthy investigation, Mississippi authorities charged Rubenstein in September
1998 with the three murders, but a trial in June 1999 ended in a hung jury, with
jurors voting eleven to one to convict him of capital murder. Rubenstein was
tried again, and in February 2000 he was convicted of three counts of first-
degree murder and sentenced to death.22 Rubenstein now awaits execution in
Mississippi; his conviction and sentence are on appeal.23 In September 2000,
18 Id. at 278-79.
19 See Tara Young, Marrero Man Guilty of Killing 3 Relatives, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICA-
YUNE, Feb. 8, 2000, at BI.
20 Associate Press Newswires, Feb. 7, 2000.
21 State News in Brief, COMMERICAL-APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Feb. 8, 2000, at DS5.
22 Id.
23 For information about and a photograph of Alan Rubenstein, see http:II
www.mdoc.state.ms.us/Death%20Row/Death%2ORow%201nmates%20PDF%2OFiles/
Rubenstein,%20Alan%20Michael.PDF (last visited Sept. 24, 2001).
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Darrell's father brought a $15 million lawsuit against Rubenstein, his wife, and
the New York Life Insurance Company, which sold the policy on Krystal's life.
Among the allegations in the suit is the claim that Doris knew that her husband
had murdered Connor in 1979 in an attempt to collect insurance proceeds and
did nothing to thwart Rubenstein's scheme with respect to Krystal.2 4
Hunting, guns, and insurance do not mix well. Throw in some whiskey,
and the delicate mixture becomes even more unstable. That recipe is part of the
story of Harvey Hankinson and Henry Lakin.
II. MAY HARVEY REST IN PEACE
The tragic character in this story is W. Harvey Hankinson. A World War
II veteran who was discharged from the military in 1949, Harvey returned to
his hometown in South Carolina to work in his father's garage as an auto
mechanic and to operate a wood and coal business. One can only speculate as
to why Harvey abandoned his wife and four children in early 1954, but plainly
Harvey's world was not on an upward trajectory. He worked in the kitchen of a
railroad section gang for a time and was a patient in the Kansas City Veterans
Hospital from August 9 to 19, 1954.25 Harvey had a problem with alcohol; his
brother Earl would later testify that Harvey's excessive drinking was the reason
his business failed in the early 1950s and that Harvey was "a drunkard, a dere-
lict and a floater."'26 Keeping track of his financial portfolio was not particu-
larly important to Harvey; he let his life insurance, obtained as a member of the
Armed Forces, terminate for nonpayment of premiums. Indeed, by mid-
August, 1954, insurance must not have been particularly relevant in a life that
must have seemed, even from Harvey's perspective, rather empty, if not in utter
shambles. Sadly, things only got worse when Henry Lakin entered the story.
Henry Lakin was a small-time roofing and siding contractor with an office
in his home. In the August 19, 1954, Kansas City newspapers, he placed an ad
in the "help wanted" sections, which read as follows: "MAN-Age 25 to 30,
single, start as helper and learn trade; wages plus room and board; prefer person
with no family ties."
Harvey saw the ad and replied by telephone. Henry suggested that they
meet at a drug store near the Veterans Hospital, and Henry hired him on the
spot. Would Henry have us think that Harvey was a strong interviewer, partic-
ularly just after his release from the hospital? Or that Henry saw great potential
in him? Apparently, it mattered little to Henry that Harvey was homeless, pen-
niless, and certainly without resume in hand.
Henry not only hired Harvey but also took Harvey home and let him move
into the Lakin residence. The first couple of jobs Harvey performed for Henry
were compensated through room and board. After the first week, Henry paid
Harvey some money, but the amount was variable because he did "piece work."
24 Victims' La. Family Sue Miss. Inmate, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, Sept. 14, 2000, at 9B.
25 Harvey was not hospitalized for an alcohol-related illness. He had problems with his
teeth, two of which were extracted under general anesthesia during the stay in the VA hospi-
tal. Statement, Brief, and Argument for Respondent at 2, Lakin v. Postal Life & Cas. Co.,
316 S.W.2d 542 (Mo. 1958) (No. 46075) (citing Exhibit 65).
26 Lakin v. Postal Life & Cas. Co., 316 S.W.2d 542 (Mo. 1958).
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But Harvey caught on quickly, Henry would say, which led Henry to conceive
the plan to make Harvey his partner. Under the "percentage arrangement" that
Henry devised, Harvey's shares "grew rapidly," as Henry would testify later,
even though no books or records documented the financial aspects of their rela-
tionship. Indeed, there was no written partnership agreement, no partnership
name ("we hadn't got to that," Henry said), no letterhead, no business cards, no
invoices, and no contract that mentioned Harvey's name. Harvey purchased no
share of Henry's equipment and made no capital contribution to the
partnership.
Interestingly, Harvey was not Henry's first business partner. Three prior
partnerships had short durations, but a fourth with a fellow named Frederick E.
Scott lasted about three years. Consistent with Henry's manner of doing busi-
ness, no written agreement evidenced that partnership either. The Lakin-Scott
partnership was supposedly a "fifty-fifty" relationship, but Henry was plainly
the senior partner in the deal: Scott "gave" his share of the money to Henry,
and then Henry gave Scott "what he needed." Like Harvey, Scott also lived at
Henry's home, and insurance figured in both the Lakin-Scott and the Lakin-
Hankinson partnerships. Indeed, Henry described himself as a "believer" in
insurance; he carried approximately $80,000 of insurance on his own life.
Thus, Scott and Henry each took out insurance on their own lives naming the
other as beneficiary, although Scott would testify that he thought Henry had
named Henry's spouse as beneficiary. Adding to the curiosity was Scott's tes-
timony that he could not remember ever seeing the policies or paying any pre-
miums. Scott's relationship with Henry took a definite turn for the negative
after Henry attacked Scott with an iron pipe, although Scott stayed with Henry
after the attack because he had nowhere else to go.27 Scott left for good shortly
after he had an accident with Henry's car. No record existed of the dissolution
or settlement of the Scott-Lakin partnership (if, we might fairly wonder, it ever
existed).
Henry testified that his interest in insurance proved influential to Harvey.
Henry was good friends with a Prudential agent, Tom Ballard. On August 26,
1954, less than a week after Henry and Harvey became acquainted, Ballard
took Harvey's application for a $50,000 ten-year term double indemnity policy,
on which Henry would be named as the beneficiary. The Prudential home
office, though, had some doubts, and it asked Ballard to justify the application.
Ballard explained that Harvey was to receive twenty-five percent of the profits
in exchange for his investment of $5,000 in the enterprise. Although Prudential
apparently did not know that Ballard's explanation was false, it rejected the
application anyway.
But Tom Ballard had a brother, Dayton Ballard, who was both an agent
for Prudential and a soliciting agent for Postal Life. Tom asked Dayton
whether Postal Life might issue the policy, and Dayton suggested that Harvey
apply to Postal Life for a five-year term policy in the amount of $25,000 with
double indemnity and with a proposed designation of Harvey's wife as the ben-
eficiary. Harvey was willing to apply for this kind of coverage, and Dayton
27 On cross-examination, Scott admitted he had been subject to some black-out spells.
Statement, Brief, and Argument of Appellant at 9, Lakin v. Postal Life & Cas. Co., 316
S.W.2d 542 (Mo. 1958) (No. 46075) (citing trial transcript at 461-62).
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wrote out Harvey's answers on the application form. It turned out that several
false answers appeared on this form: the question on whether the applicant had
ever been refused insurance was answered incorrectly; Harvey's financial
worth and net income were misrepresented; and one answer represented that
Harvey had always been "a person of good habits and reputation."
Dayton delivered this application, along with Harvey's check for $58.75
for the first premium, to Postal Life's "city manager," along with the explana-
tion that if Postal Life issued the policy, the beneficiary would be changed to
Henry and an additional policy of $25,000 for business insurance would be
requested, as all of this was what Harvey really wanted. Dayton testified that
he added a notation to the application requesting issuance of an additional
$25,000 policy with the "same beneficiary," but he did not explain why Har-
vey's wife would be named as beneficiary on a policy intended to insure the
business. Harvey later had a medical examination and purportedly gave a num-
ber of false answers here as well: that he had never had a life or health policy
rejected; had never been in a hospital or other institution for treatment (except
for the extraction of two teeth in 1954); had never had any disease, injury, or
illness; and had not consulted a physician during the past seven years.
Postal Life, it turned out, was not without some reservations about the
application, although Postal Life had less reluctance than Prudential. Postal
Life was willing to issue one $25,000 policy with an up-rated premium; appar-
ently, Harvey's drinking habits were of some concern. Dayton, interestingly
enough, called Henry to discuss this development, and Henry said that Postal
Life should go ahead and issue the policy. The policy, which had an issue date
of October 13, 1954, was not, however, the one requested; instead, the Postal
Life policy was a $25,000 endowment policy with no double indemnity, with
Harvey's wife designated as the beneficiary. The quarterly premium for this
policy was $276, much more than Harvey anticipated. When Harvey saw this
figure, he said (according to Dayton's testimony) that he did not want the pol-
icy because of its high cost. But Dayton interjected the possibility of using the
policy as business insurance, and, after some discussion, Henry "took it as busi-
ness insurance" (according, again, to Dayton's testimony). Henry paid the
additional premium ($217.88 beyond the $58.75 previously paid), and Dayton
took steps "right away" to secure forms to effect a change of ownership and
beneficiary of the policy, as per the understanding reached at this meeting.
Harvey signed these forms on November 29, 1954. Similar forms were exe-
cuted by Henry to substitute Harvey as the beneficiary of the $25,000 policy
issued by Prudential on the life of Henry, with respect to which Scott had previ-
ously been designated the beneficiary.
The $25,000 policy on Harvey's life and the $80,000 of insurance on
Henry's life were more than ample to cover whatever income the Lakin-Han-
kinson partnership generated in 1954. In fact, as the court would reconstruct
the financial aspects of the insurance package, the monthly premium for the
Pilot Life policy on Harvey's life was $92.21, and the cost of the insurance on
Henry's life was about $100 a month. Henry's 1954 individual income tax
return showed $1,338.16 of "partnership profit," which made up a significant
portion of his gross income for the year of $3,346, which after deductions net-
ted out to $2,857 - a figure only a few hundred dollars more than Henry's
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insurance premium obligations for the calendar year. The "business insurance"
aspects of the Pilot Life policy were also forgotten by Henry when he com-
pleted the 1954 income tax return for the Lakin-Hankinson partnership,
because he took no deduction on the return for the cost of the business insur-
ance policy.
The first quarterly premium on the Postal Life policy was due on January
13, 1955, but this premium was not paid. Henry would testify that neither he
nor Harvey intended to pay it. Events would overtake, however, whatever
intentions Henry and Harvey had with respect to the policy. On January 17,
1955, a date conveniently within the policy's thirty-day grace period, the two
men went on a hunting trip together near Pleasant Hill, Missouri, and only
Henry came back alive.
Henry, the only eyewitness to Harvey's death, explained Harvey's demise
as an accident. Under Henry's version of the events, Henry had permission to
hunt on a farmer's property, and he and Harvey decided to do so. They also
took some whiskey with them because, as Henry testified, "that kind of goes
with hunting." The guns they took as part of this odd combination were owned
by Henry - a new .410 bolt action shotgun and an "over and under gun" (i.e., a
.22 rifle over a .410 shotgun). The hunting was poor, so the two men went to a
nearby town where they purchased more whiskey and played some pool. The
hunting resumed in the mid-afternoon at another location where they had
hunted before. Henry testified that they went down into a "little gully affair"; a
location where "there wasn't any farm houses visible down in there where we
were hunting." That makes sense, some would say, as it would be more conve-
nient for Henry if no one could see what would happen next.
Henry had the .410 shotgun, and Harvey had the "over and under gun,"
they had exchanged the guns they had been using in the morning with hopes for
some better luck. After about an hour of fruitless hunting, Harvey described, as
summarized by the court, the next set of events:
Hankinson, who was walking behind [Henry], "said something," and [Henry] turned
around. They were then facing each other, about two to three feet apart, with Han-
kinson a little to [Henry's] right. Hankinson was carrying his gun with his right hand
eight to twelve inches down from the muzzle, the barrel pointed forward and the butt
down. [Henry] testified that Hankinson said, "Hell, I can't hit anything with this
either," and that he "flipped it [the gun] up to me." [Henry], with the .410 shotgun in
his right hand with his finger on the trigger and the barrel pointed down, grasped the
"over and under gun" at the small of the stock when it was above his waist but below
his shoulder. He stated his left index finger must have hit the trigger and that the gun
discharged when the muzzle was eight to ten inches from Hankinson. The charge
struck him in the chest. [Henry] could get no response from Hankinson and he went
for help.
2 8
At this point, Harvey was almost certainly dead. Help eventually arrived,
and Harvey was carried a quarter-mile to a car that was used to transport him to
the doctor, who made the official pronouncement that Harvey was no more.
The next day, Henry contacted Tom Ballard, who in turn called Dayton Bal-
28 Lakin, 316 S.W.2d at 548.
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lard, for the purpose of requesting forms on which a proof of loss could be
filed.29
Harvey's version of events perished with his last breath, but one can
surmise what explanation of the events Harvey might have given based on the
testimony of the experienced pathologist who examined Harvey's clothing and
his exhumed body on June 2, 1956. First, the pathologist did not find any
evidence of burning or scorching, which would be expected if the fatal gunshot
were fired from a weapon the barrel of which was less than a foot from Har-
vey's chest. Second, the pathologist's reconstruction of the path of the shotgun
charge did not square with Henry's story. Under Henry's version of events,
"the course of travel of the shot would have been from right to left through
Harvey's body and on an upward or level course," but the pathologist found
that "the course of the shot was from left to right and downward."3 Third,
Harvey's body revealed some broken bones in the chest area that were unre-
lated to the shotgun wound. Specifically, the pathologist testified that "the
manubrium (top) bone of Hankinson's breast bone showed an unhealed trans-
verse fracture and that there was a vertical fracture of the right second costal
cartilage through its junction with the breast bone, and that these were above
the shotgun wound and not caused by the shotgun charge. '3 1 One can only
speculate how those bones were broken; curiously, Henry testified that Harvey
had not been injured in any other accident.
What, then, did Harvey's eyes see at the moment of his death? If Henry
put the "over and under gun" to his shoulder and fired at Harvey, the path of
29 Statement, Brief, and Argument for Respondent at 6, Lakin v. Postal Life & Cas. Co.,
316 S.W.2d 542 (Mo. 1958) (No. 46075) (citing trial transcript at 59, 93, 109).
30 Lakin, 316 S.W.2d at 548. The pathologist testified that
the shotgun charge entered the body in the third intercostal space approximately two and one-
fourth inches to the left of the breast bone; that "the line flight of the shotgun charge was from
left to right slightly downward from horizontal and backward at an angle of about 45 degree[s]"
and that the death was almost immediate.
Id. Similar testimony was given by the undertaker who had embalmed the deceased. State-
ment, Brief, and Argument for Appellant at 8, Lakin v. Postal Life & Cas. Co., 316 S.W.2d
542 (Mo. 1958) (No. 46075) (citing trial transcript at 421). Lakin's story, in contrast, was
that he caught the gun Harvey tossed to him with his left hand, grabbing it at the small
portion of the stock and apparently hitting the trigger with his left index finger. Thus, it was
the gun that Henry caught which fired and killed Harvey. Although I have never tried to
catch with one hand a loaded rifle which has been tossed to me, it is hard to imagine catch-
ing any kind of tubular object with one hand in a manner that would involve the end opposite
from the end where the object is caught being lower than the end which is caught. Indeed, it
is hard to imagine throwing a rifle in a manner that would cause the stock to be higher than
the end of the barrel at the moment it is caught, unless one were flipping it end over end -
which seems unlikely, even for an experienced gun-thrower. Another possibility would have
the deceased being bent at the waist and leaning forward - as if to bow to Henry - at the
time the weapon was fired, although this seems an unlikely attitude for Harvey immediately
after throwing a gun. As appellant conceded in its brief, "[tihe doctor's testimony that the
gun was at a forty-five degree angle would tend to contradict [Henry's] testimony, if it be
material." Statement, Brief, and Argument for Appellant at 35, Lakin v. Postal Life & Cas.
Co., 316 S.W.2d 542 (Mo. 1958) (No. 46075). Another possibility is that Harvey was on his
knees, begging for mercy, at the time he was shot. Alternatively, he might have been dis-
abled by crushing blows to the chest (which broke some of his bones) and shot while laying
on the ground.
31 Id.
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the charge would have been downward. If Harvey had been struck with the
butt of the gun with enough force to break bones in his chest and if he were on
his knees begging for his life, the path of the shot would have been downward.
If the lack of scorching meant the gun must have been fired from some dis-
tance, is it possible that Henry broke bones in the chest of a man already dead
out of spite for a man not savvy enough to figure out Henry's evil scheme?
Henry was not prosecuted for Harvey's death. One can only speculate as
to why this did not occur. The inquest into Harvey's death the night of the
shooting concluded that the shooting was accidental. 32 The pathologist's testi-
mony was secured almost eighteen months after Harvey died, so this testimony
was not available to the prosecutor. Perhaps the prosecutor did not see any
particular reason to question Henry's facially plausible story. Perhaps the pros-
ecutor shared the court's suspicions, but he thought the odds of marshaling
enough evidence to secure a jury's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
to be too low to justify the expense of a prosecution. But Postal Life had its
suspicions. Without the ability to demonstrate beyond a preponderance that
Henry intentionally slew Harvey, the insurer turned to other doctrines to reach,
what it thought, would be the reasonable outcome in the circumstances.
Ill. MORAL HAZARD
In the world of inextricably linked pairs, one finds the likes of Rogers and
Hammerstein, Richard Nixon and Watergate, Neil Armstrong and the moon,
golf and Tiger Woods, and insurance and moral hazard. Of course, each part of
the pair has a separate identity for some purposes. For example, one can think
about golf without having Tiger Woods in mind, and Tiger undoubtedly has
personal friends who know him as someone other than a golfer. But most of us
will not dwell upon one part of the pair for long without at least a fleeting
thought about the other. Such is the case with insurance and moral hazard.
As Professor Tom Baker has demonstrated in his careful study of moral
hazard's "genealogy," moral hazard's cultural and technical meanings have
evolved over time.33 Baker explains that nineteenth-century insurers under-
stood moral hazard as "an unwholesome mix of bad character and temptation
which the insurers had a responsibility to ferret out from the insurance enter-
prise."34 This conception survives to the present,3" but it is now accompanied
by neoclassical economists' explanation of moral hazard as insurance's "inevi-
table" tendency to "increase[ ] the occurrence, magnitude, or cost of that which
is insured against" by altering incentives to prevent or reduce Ioss. 3 6
These two strands are evident in modern discussions of moral hazard. For
example, one prominent insurance treatise distinguishes the "physical charac-
teristics of the risk" from the "human element in the insurance relationship"
32 See Statement, Brief, and Argument for Appellant at 8, Lakin v. Postal Life & Cas. Co.,
316 S.W.2d 542 (Mo. 1958) (No. 46075) (citing trial transcript at 291 and Exhibit 42).
" See Tom Baker, The Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996).
34 Id. at 240.
31 See id. at 265-67.
36 Id. at 241. 267-75.
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and refers to the latter as "moral hazard., 37 By "human element," the authors
refer to the "condition where an insured deliberately brings about the event
insured against or deliberately 'pads' a claim" and state that moral hazard
"arises from a combination of moral weakness and financial difficulty."
38
Then, the writers draw a distinction between "moral hazard" and "morale haz-
ard," considering the latter to be a closely related "attitude problem" involving
the "absence of a desire to safeguard property or the absence of concern over
the reasonable settlement of a liability or compensation claim. ' 39 Thus, this
presentation of moral hazard distinguishes between intentionally bringing about
(or exaggerating, in the context of claims processing) a loss and the insured's
failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent loss (or lack of enthusiasm for
reasonable claims processing outcomes), but it anchors moral hazard in the
insured's immoral tendencies, which may become manifest when the insured
confronts the temptations wrought by economic hardship and, presumably, the
desire for economic gain. In contrast, Professor Abraham embraces the econo-
mists' moral hazard when he explains that insurers seek to base premiums on
the expected losses of their insureds, but this effort is frustrated because
"insureds to some extent control the probability that losses will occur. Once an
individual has purchased insurance, his or her incentive to control losses
decreases."4 This leads to a definition of moral hazard as "the resulting ten-
dency of an insured to under allocate to loss prevention after purchasing insur-
ance."41 This is consistent with my own effort to explain moral hazard in the
context of the economics of insurance.42
Both conceptions of moral hazard are evident in the facts of Lakin.
Although the precise circumstances of the hunting trip are forever hidden from
view, we are left with the inescapable conclusion that Henry's moral bank-
ruptcy and his desire for money led to his engineering of the insurance arrange-
ment and the destruction of Harvey's life. If one peels away the moral
dimensions of Henry's acts, one is left with an illustration of the inherent ten-
dency of insurance to increase the probability of loss. The insurer's effort to
escape responsibility under the policy then stands as an effort to preserve the
integrity of the risk pool, which is otherwise compromised by the operation of
the phenomenon of moral hazard.
37 S.S. HUEBNER, KENNETH BLACK, JR., & BERNARD L. WEBB, PROPERTY AND LIABILITY
INSURANCE 605 (4th ed. 1996).
38 Id. at 605-06.
39 Id. at 606.
40 KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 14 (1986).
" Id. For more examples of economic formulations of moral hazard, see Baker, supra note
33, at 267-75.
42 See JERRY, supra note 6 (explaining moral hazard, stating that the existence of insurance
can have the perverse effect of increasing the probability of loss). See also STEMPEL, supra
note 9, § 1.05 (reviewing concept of moral hazard as including both the concept of careless-
ness and temptation toward skulduggery).
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IV. THE DARK SIDE OF INSURANCE
In the fantasy world of Star Wars,43 the characters who place their faith in
the peace and harmony of the "Force" compete with those who have suc-
cumbed to the Force's "dark side," thereby threatening the well-being of the
entire galaxy. Of course, the Star Wars story is, among other things, a meta-
phor for the struggles between good and evil, freedom and tyranny, and com-
munity and self-aggrandizement. Just as the Force has its good and bad
dimensions, insurance is a force for good which, with the slightest tweaking,
can evolve into a means of channeling evil.
The earliest examples of insurance show insurance as a force for good.
These are found in the risk distribution mechanisms devised by Babylonian and
Greek merchants who, in ancient times, accompanied their goods on voyages to
distant markets across the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. Sudden storms
were among the perils of these voyages, and the merchants' goods could be
tossed overboard upon the orders of the ship's captain to lighten the vessel and
preserve the lives of those on board and such cargo on the vessel as might be
saved. To reduce the risk of the catastrophic losses which could be visited on
individual merchants, shippers and merchants devised a system whereby each
merchant would share, if the ship completed its voyage safely, the loss of any
one of them pro rata among themselves. This system, which has survived fun-
damentally intact to the present in admiralty law as the principle of "general
average," was a mutual aid society on a very small scale - an ex ante allocation
of the risk of uncertain loss.'
The precise details of how these arrangements among merchants on a voy-
age evolved to more sophisticated systems of risk transfer and distribution are
obscure, but at some point it probably became apparent that pooling the risks of
many voyages was a more effective way to distribute risk than simply pooling
the risk among the shippers on one voyage. The emergence of commercial
insurance also had something to do with how the ancient merchant financed his
business. It was common for these early traders to borrow funds, but in ancient
Greece, the consequence of failing to repay the loan (which could happen if the
cargo was lost at sea or the shipper failed to survive the voyage) was that the
merchant or his heirs might become slaves upon the loan's foreclosure. To
address this problem, the "bottomry loan" arrangement emerged, under which
the lender took full responsibility for the loss of the ship or cargo. The rates of
interests on these loans were very high (sometimes as much as one hundred
percent), but functionally the loan served as both an investment in the business
and insurance against the risk of loss. At some point, the insurance aspects of
the bottomry loan must have been separated from the loan's investment pur-
43 See DAVID W. REYNOLDS, STAR WARS: THE VISUAL DICTIONARY (1998).
44 For more discussion, see JAMES A. JOYCE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE OF
EVERY KIND 1-4 (1917); RICHARD LOWNDES, THE LAW OF GENERAL AVERAGE: ENGLISH
AND FOREIGN 2-3 (4th ed. 1888); ROBERT H. JERRY, II, THE COMMUNITARIAN VALUES OF
INSURANCE (Aug. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the NEVADA LAW JOURNAL).
See generally PETER BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK
(1994).
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poses, and one result of this separation would have been the emergence of the
commercial business of insurance.4 5
In both its ancient and sophisticated modem forms, insurance makes busi-
ness possible that would not otherwise occur. In a macro sense, it is no exag-
geration to assert that insurance has been an essential element of economic
development throughout history and around the world. In a micro sense, insur-
ance enables entrepreneurs to substitute certain, periodic payments for the pos-
sibility that a catastrophic loss will destroy one's entire investment. For
individuals, insurance makes possible the preservation of work and accumu-
lated savings, the maintenance of lifestyles and prosperity, and the realization
of future dreams that would be dashed by unexpected loss but for the presence
of insurance. Embedded in the insurance arrangement is the contribution of
individuals to a communitarian enterprise, out of which the miseries of the
unfortunate are alleviated. As Professor Deborah Stone explains, 46 insurance
provides an opportunity for individuals to contribute to the collective "for the
benefit of others who might suffer from loss when [the individual] does not,"
thereby "call[ing] forth [the] moral motives... of charity, compassion, civic
responsibility, and justice."4 7 This is insurance at its best.
Lakin summons the sobering reality, however, that insurance, like the
Force, has a dark side. For centuries, there have been those who would use the
insurance contract to take advantage of others, to provide a means to unde-
served gains, and to effectively steal an undeserved allocation from the collec-
tive. Lakin is a prime exhibit in this category, for the story of Harvey
Hankinson reminds us that insurance, notwithstanding all the good it facilitates
and its important role in maximizing wealth and security, is sometimes used to
promote suffering and despair. In fact, a significant component of insurance
law is aimed directly at those practices that would convert insurance from a
force for good into a tool for evil.
V. THE DOCTRINAL CONTENT OF LAKIN
In addition to providing a foundation for reflection on the themes dis-
cussed above, Lakin is interesting as a source of insurance doctrine. Because it
appears to involve a killing-for-profit scheme, Lakin puts in play the various
principles that seek to deter and remedy a person's intentional destruction of
life for the purpose of profiting under an insurance contract. If Henry did mur-
der Harvey, Henry would have been disqualified from receiving the proceeds
under one, and perhaps two different, rules. First, as a slaying beneficiary, he
would have been considered the functional equivalent of a predeceasing benefi-
ciary, meaning that he would have been disqualified from taking any pro-
ceeds.48 Second, if Henry secured his ownership interest in the policy on
11 For more discussion, see C.F. TRENERRY, THE ORIGIN AND EARLY HISTORY OF INSUR-
ANCE 243-82 (1926); WILLIAM R. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 10-11 (3d
ed. 1951); LIONEL CASSON, ANCIENT TRADE AND SOCIETY 26 (1979); JERRY, supra note 6.
46 See Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN.
INS. L. J. 11 (1999).
47 Id. at 14.
48 JERRY, supra note 6, at 296-99.
Summer 2002]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
Harvey's life with the simultaneously held intent of slaying Harvey, the policy
would have been void ab initio, which would also prevent Henry from receiv-
ing any benefit under it.4 9
Although the two rules impact Henry identically in that each prevents him
from receiving proceeds under the policy, the rules have vastly different impli-
cations for third parties. Under the "slaying beneficiary" rule, the policy is not
void, and any designated contingent beneficiaries take proceeds; further, at
least under modem policy forms, in the absence of any qualified beneficiary the
proceeds are paid to the estate. Under the "fraud in the inducement" rule, the
policy is treated as never having become effective, and the remedy is rescis-
sion. In this event, neither contingent beneficiaries nor the cestui que vie's
estate is entitled to the proceeds. Thus, if the insurer's denial of Henry's claim
were premised on Henry's alleged role in intentionally causing Harvey's death,
Harvey's heirs - presumably his wife and children - would have had a stake in
how the case were resolved. Having Henry's claim denied under the slaying
beneficiary rule would have preserved their ability to acquire the proceeds
through the rules of intestate succession. There is no indication in the court's
opinion, however, that Harvey's wife, who presumably still lived in South Car-
olina at the time of the proceedings, pressed any claim upon or interest in how
the insurance proceeds were disposed. Indeed, there is reason to think that she
had no knowledge of the existence of the policy; Postal Life's brief made the
point that Henry's attorney wrote to Harvey's wife regarding her possible
claims on another insurance policy but made no reference to the Postal Life
policy at issue in the case.5"
Because the insurance company was contesting the policy, the insurer was
inevitably attracted to insurance law doctrines that would invalidate the policy
in toto. Postal Life argued that Henry's conduct in bringing about Harvey's
death prevented him from taking proceeds, but the insurer also alleged the inva-
lidity of the policy on account of misrepresentations in the application and
Henry's lack of an insurable interest in Harvey's life.5 The court ultimately
decided the case based on the insurable interest argument. Under the general
rule, one cannot take out an insurance policy on the life of another without an
insurable interest in the life of that person.52 The insurable interest can be
based on a close familial relationship - the court called this "blood or affin-
ity"53 - or on an economic or pecuniary relationship, such that the person tak-
ing out the insurance stands to benefit or be advantaged from the continued
living of the cestui que vie. The logic of this rule is directly related to moral
hazard: if the owner of the policy benefits from or is dependent upon the cestui
49 See id. Complicating the application of this rule is the fact that the policy at issue was
initially issued to Harvey on his own life, and Henry became the owner by virtue of Har-
vey's assignment to Henry. It would seem, however, that if a party secures an assignment of
a policy on someone else's life with a simultaneously held intent to slay the cestui que vie,
the assignment should be void under the same logic that the issuance of a policy under the
same circumstances is void.
10 Statement, Brief, and Argument for Respondent at 6, Lakin v. Postal Life & Cas. Co., 316
S.W.2d 542 (Mo. 1958) (No. 46075) (citing Exhibit 25).
51 See Lakin v. Postal Life & Cas. Co., 316 S.W.2d 542, 545 (Mo. 1958).
52 See generally JERRY, supra note 6, at 250-54.
53 See Lakin, 316 S.W.2d at 549.
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que vie's continued living, it follows that the owner will not seek to bring about
the cestui que vie's death in order to secure insurance proceeds.
Henry countered Postal Life's assertion of this defense in two ways. First,
he argued that he did have an insurable interest in Harvey' life because the two
men were business partners. Not surprisingly, the court said it "taxes one's
credulity"54 to find the existence of a bona fide partnership in these circum-
stances. But even if there were some indications of a "legal partnership," such
a circumstance, standing alone, would not be enough to create an insurable
interest, notwithstanding frequent references in insurance law to partners hav-
ing insurable interests in the lives of each other. In the absence of a mutual
dependence based on a legitimate economic relationship, no insurable interest
would exist." In other words, substance would be elevated over form.
Second, Henry argued that even if he lacked an insurable interest in Har-
vey's life, none was necessary because Henry's interest in the policy was
secured through Henry's assignment of his ownership rights in the policy to
Henry and the change of beneficiary (to Henry) which accompanied this trans-
fer. In other words, Henry argued that the policy was issued to Harvey, with
Harvey's wife named as beneficiary; as the owner of the policy, Harvey was
free to both name any beneficiary he chose and assign the policy to anyone he
desired, whether or not the beneficiary or assignee possessed an interest in Har-
vey's life. Henry's statement of the relevant insurance law principles was cor-
rect. Harvey had an unlimited insurable interest in his own life and could
designate any beneficiary, including one without an insurable interest.5 6 More-
over, in a majority of states, the owner of a policy can assign it to someone who
lacks an insurable interest in the owner's life, provided the assignment is not a
cover for wagering.5 7 The rationale underlying both rules is that it is not
against public policy for one person (a beneficiary or assignee) to be in a posi-
tion where profit will be gained from the cestui que vie's death, provided the
cestui que vie consents to the person stepping into that position. The assump-
tion is that the consent will not be given if the cestui que vie has concerns that
moral hazard will be manifested in the assignee or beneficiary attempting to
terminate the life of the cestui que vie.
The court might have reasoned that the assignment in this case was, in
fact, a cover for a wagering contract, meaning a contract speculating on the
longevity of another in circumstances where the wagerer has no stake in the
cestui que vie's survival. The antiwagering rationale for the insurable interest
doctrine dates to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England, when it became
popular in some segments of society to purchase insurance on the life of an
unrelated third party as a wager or bet on whether the cestui que vie would
54 Id. at 550.
55 Id. ("While it is true that partners usually, and perhaps in most cases, have an insurable
interest in the life of a copartner, it is the existence of circumstances which arise out of or by
reason of the partnership, and not the mere existence of the partnership itself, that give rise to
an insurable interest.").
56 See JERRY, supra note 6, at 250.
51 See id. at 306. Missouri would later change this rule by statute, opting instead to prohibit
the assignment of a policy to someone lacking an insurable interest except in particular
circumstances. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 377.080 (2000).
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survive past the time designated in the policy. 58 This theme is only one part of
the life insurance business's effort in those centuries to rebut claims that the
insurance business is, at its root, an illegitimate gambling enterprise,5 9 and the
antiwagering theme of the insurable interest cases is fairly read as an effort to
help legitimize the industry. The antiwagering theme ultimately returns to
moral hazard concerns, i.e., concerns that insurance contracts would encourage
those who would benefit from the payoffs to hasten the demise of those whose
lives were insured, which brings one back to the situation presented by Lakin.
Obviously, Henry's procurement of the policy on Harvey's life was not a
gaming bet in the classic sense. "Insurance contract as wager," however, is
appropriately given a more expansive meaning in the context of commercial
relationships. When partners insure the lives of each other or when employers
insure the lives of key employees, the insuring party "wagers" on the life of the
cestui que vie if the amount of the coverage is disproportionately larger than
the value (discounted to the present) of the economic contribution the copartner
or key employee makes to the business. A similar situation exists if a creditor
insures the life of the debtor in an amount disproportionately larger than the
debt.6 ° If the policy would produce a windfall to its owner in the event of the
cestui que vie's death, then the insurance policy functions as a wager, with the
attendant problems of moral hazard. This kind of analysis enables an ex poste
assessment of an insurance arrangement and provides a basis for invalidating it
if the amount of insurance is unreasonably disproportionate to the risk being
insured.
The foregoing "wager analysis" is not sufficient, however, to dispose of
Lakin, given that one aspect of Henry's second argument was that Harvey had
voluntarily changed the beneficiary to Henry, as the owner of a policy is enti-
tled to do. The court's rejection of Henry's claim indicates that even benefici-
ary designations are not immune from ex poste evaluation. If the beneficiary
designation, like an assignment, serves as a subterfuge to escape the constraints
of the insurable interest doctrine, the designation will not be enforced and the
policy will be deemed void. 6' A policyholder's consent to the change, standing
alone, does not trump the subterfuge consideration. Such a conclusion is even
easier to reach in circumstances where there is substantial reason to doubt, as
was the situation in Lakin, whether the policyholder understood the implica-
tions of the transaction. 62 Again, substance triumphs over form.
58 For more discussion of the history of the origin of the insurable interest requirement, see
JERRY, supra note 6, at 233-36.
59 In the early centuries of the business, life insurance was "condemned as immoral wagers
upon human life, and in many states prohibited by law. They were not permitted in France
until 1820 .... [T]hey evidently were not regarded with favor [in England], for no effort to
provide life insurance through any organized association appears to have been made until
1706 .... " VANCE, supra note 45, at 20-21.
6 This was the situation in In re Estate of Bean v. Hazel, 972 S.W.2d 290 (Mo. 1998).
61 This implication from Lakin was specifically endorsed by the Missouri Supreme Court in
In re Estate of Bean v. Hazel, 972 S.W.2d 290.
62 Lakin v. Postal Life & Cas. Co., 316 S.W.2d 542, 552 (Mo. 1958) ("This unquestionably
constituted one transaction whereby [Henry] caused to be issued for his own benefit a policy
of insurance, for which he paid the premium, on the life of Hankinson in which he had no
insurable interest.").
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VI. LAKIN'S LESSONS FOR LEGAL PROCESS
As discussed above, insurance law has no shortage of rules to prevent one
who slays another from securing the proceeds of an insurance policy. But the
implementation of such rules depends on the existence of evidence to justify
their invocation, and this was undoubtedly one problem facing Postal Life in
the Lakin case. Henry was the only surviving eyewitness to Harvey's death,
and, although the circumstances were extraordinarily suspicious, no one was
available to testify against Henry's version of the events. In the absence of
evidence sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Henry intention-
ally slew Harvey, it is understandable that prosecutors and other law enforce-
ment officials would not be enthusiastic about pursuing criminal proceedings.
Indeed, establishing an intentional slaying beyond a preponderance of the evi-
dence was not a given, particularly without the evidence produced by the exhu-
mation of Harvey's body and the expert testimony of the pathologist. In
circumstances where the evidence invoking the disqualification rules was rela-
tively weak, the insurable interest doctrine served as a "fall-back" doctrine to
prevent Henry from gaining access to the proceeds.
Thus, Lakin stands as an example of how the common law - in this cir-
cumstance, the common law of insurance - flexes to promote justice, or at least
what is thought to be the just outcome. The facts of Lakin show facially appro-
priate changes in beneficiary designations and ownership interests, but a closer
look reveals a deliberate effort to evade the rules that seek to prevent insurance
from being used to generate profits from the intentional killing of others. As
we would hope, the common law does not respond mechanically to such
wrongs, but instead finds enough flex in the rules to prevent such profiteering.
Assignments and beneficiary designations that are subterfuges to escape the
insurable interest doctrine will be invalidated. This approach allows subjective
assessment of the circumstances of particular cases, thereby securing both the
justice and efficiency advantages of disqualifying slaying beneficiaries. The
technicalities of the form of the transaction do not triumph over fair resolution
of the underlying substance. This is the common law at its best.
VII. EPILOGUE
Lakin is now a fairly old case, and the principal players in the drama have
dwindled in number. For example, Postal Life no longer exists; it was acquired
in April 1962 by Republic National Life Insurance Company, which was in
turn acquired by American General a few years ago. Postal Life's records must
exist somewhere, but I had no success in locating them. It would be interesting
to read internal memoranda recording the deliberations leading up to the
insurer's decision to contest the claim. The computer records of American
General do have a curious reference to a life policy on someone named "Han-
kinson." A staff person with whom I spoke on the telephone, and who was
willing to check these records, expressed puzzlement at the entry, as she had
not seen that sort of entry before.6 3 That curious digital record is what one
63 Telephone Interview with "Nikki" (May 24, 2001).
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might expect for a case as unusual as this one, but it was impossible to learn
anything more about this reference. My letter to American General's legal
department received no response, but I was not surprised; answering this kind
of request is the sort of thing that has no up-side for an insurer's staff, who
have more important matters on their agendas than tracking down fifty-year-old
case files.6 4
As best I can tell, the attorneys who were involved in the case are either
retired or deceased. 65 But I have reason to think that Lakin was a memorable
experience for the lawyers who worked on it. I noticed that Laird Bowman
66
was one of the attorneys for Postal Life in the Supreme Court proceeding; by
coincidence, my path had crossed with his at the University of Kansas some
years back, and I had the opportunity to visit with Mr. Bowman about the
case.67 He remembered the case well, even though he was a young attorney in
the "third chair" when the case was appealed. James Moore, the lead attorney
for Postal Life, went on to a distinguished career as a circuit judge in Jackson
County, Missouri, for many years. Mr. Bowman strongly encouraged me to
visit with Judge Moore because the Judge viewed Lakin as one of the most
interesting cases of his career. In the summer of 2001, however, Judge Moore
was in ill health, and at the time of this writing, the odds of ever getting the
benefit of his perspectives on the case are quite low. It was easy to secure
copies of the briefs in the case from the Missouri Supreme Court Library.
Efforts to locate the trial transcript and inspect some exhibits were less success-
ful, meeting the same fate as the search for the insurance file. Not surprisingly,
the Jackson County Clerk's office rarely handles requests for case files from
the mid-1950s, and the staff was unable to provide much assistance. 68
Roger Henderson put Lakin in the first edition of his insurance law
casebook, 69 and it survived to the second.7 ° The case is not cited in other
6I A staff person advised me to write to the insurer's office of legal counsel. I did so on
May 31, 2001, but as of September 25, 2001, had received no reply.
65 1 visited with Don G. Stubbs, who represented Henry on appeal. Mr. Stubbs remembered
the case but did not remember many details; it was his recollection that another member of
his firm, James Williams, tried the case. Mr. Williams would later move to another state,
and it is Mr. Stubbs' understanding that Mr. Williams is now deceased. Telephone Interview
with Don G. Stubbs (Sept. 25, 2001).
66 1 was a member of the faculty at the University of Kansas Law School from 1981 to
1994, and served as the law school dean there during the last five years of that tenure. At
that time, Laird P. Bowman worked for the Kansas University Endowment Association.
67 Telephone Interview with Laird P. Bowman (May 24, 2001).
68 During June 2001, when I sought the assistance of the Jackson County Clerk's office, the
Kansas City Star reported that from 1990 to 2000 the office had reported less than half of the
3425 felony driving convictions to the State Department of Revenue, which in turn did not
know to suspend the drivers' licenses of these persons, a group which included some cases
of drunken driving and vehicular homicide. See Joe Lambet, Crackdown on drivers falls
short; Over half of felony cases are not reported, KANSAS CITY STAR, June 15, 2001, at A1;
Jackson County clerical errors put people at risk on state's roads, KANSAS CITY STAR, June
16, 2001, at B6. Needless to say, I was not optimistic that an office, which at the time was
seeking to explain this alleged lapse with respect to over 1700 felonies, would be able to
lend much assistance in locating a fifty-year-old civil case file.
69 ROGER C. HENDERSON, INSURANCE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1986).
70 ROGER C. HENDERSON & ROBERT H. JERRY, 1I, INSURANCE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
(2d ed. 1996).
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casebooks. When we prepared the third edition of the casebook in 2000, I
reluctantly suggested to Roger that Lakin be removed from the third edition
because a more recent Missouri case71 provided a broader range of instructional
options. Roger agreed with that assessment, so Lakin became the subject of a
note in the third edition.72 It is, therefore, unlikely that Lakin will receive
much attention in insurance law classes in the twenty-first century.
In the final accounting, then, there is not much else we are likely to learn
about Lakin. We are forced to be satisfied with a few scraps of information
about a winter day in January 1955, when two men, with whiskey and guns in
hand, took a walk in the Missouri countryside. I imagine them in overalls and
winter coats, with warm hats and gloves to protect them from the crisp winter
breeze. The dormant grass underfoot must have swished and crackled as they
walked, and the leafless trees would have permitted them to see landscapes that
would otherwise be hidden by the green leaves of summer. Harvey probably
enjoyed being outdoors as he walked through the fields and surveyed the hori-
zon, the near-by woods, the creek beds, and the fence rows. The infected teeth
that bothered him a few months before were probably healed by then. The
whiskey he had consumed probably relaxed him, making the troubles of his
personal life seem more distant, and he might have had some measurable sense
of hope for his future. Although he had experienced much in his hard life and
no doubt had made enough mistakes to last a couple of lifetimes, he had
enough innocence to prevent him from having any premonition of his fate. As
they walked toward the drama's final scene, Henry no doubt pretended to be his
friend and to share in the joy of the expedition on this winter day. Though
pausing occasionally to admire the landscape around them, Henry was probably
relentlessly focused on the execution of his plan - and his companion. Harvey
must have seen the shotgun pointed at him, and he must have heard the blast
and seen the flash when it fired.
Of course, exactly how all of this unfolded is impossible to know. But it
is from stories like these, including both their certainties and uncertainties, that
the law is made. We reconstruct as best we can, and we use our experience to
fill in the gaps. Of multiple possible versions of the story, we pick the most
plausible. We then apply legal principles to answer the questions the story
raises, and the story then exerts a push or a pull that might lead to a change in
the law or a nuance on a familiar principle. And we remain wondering what
stories the future will bring and how some of them will become manifested in
cases that affect the law and ultimately the lives of those governed by it.
71 The more recent case is In re Estate of Bean v. Hazel, 972 S.W.2d 290 (Mo. 1998). The
Estate of Bean case implicates a broader range of issues than Lakin, and the two opinions in
the four-three decision offer two distinct perspectives on the issues involved. For one per-
spective on the case, see John M. Limbaugh, Note, Life Insurance as Security for a Debt and
the Applicability of the Rule Against Wager Contracts, 64 Mo. L. REV. 693 (1999).
72 HENDERSON & JERRY, supra note 70, at 86.
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